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Abstract. Market competition has entered into the era of brand competition with economic 
growth. Brand evaluation represents an important approach for brand management and value 
enhancement. In this paper, an analysis was made, based on the triangular fuzzy matrix game 
theory, on the profits and losses incurred by participating enterprises and evaluating institutions 
due to their adoption of different game strategies. The applications of triangular fuzzy matrix game 
theory were expanded to the brand valuation field, and a theoretical method for evaluating the 
current evaluation models was proposed. 
Keywords: brand value, brand evaluation, triangular fuzzy, game. 
1. Introduction 
A great brand can help the enterprise sell products, seize the market and reduce the risk of 
consumers when purchasing products. Thus, Enterprises regard brand management as an 
important guarantee and way out for their business management and development. As an 
important part of brand management and a significant indicator for strategic performance of brand, 
brand valuation can not only effectively reflect the market status of a brand but also provide a 
reference for the future development policy-making by the enterprise and guide consumers to 
make purchase in a rational manner. However, the limited cognition of mankind and incomplete 
information during the brand valuation may impact on the accuracy of the profits and losses 
predicted and judged by the participating enterprise and the evaluating institution in advance.  
Thus, in this paper, the triangular fuzzy numbers were used to indicate the profits and losses that 
are difficult to be expressed when the parties adopted different strategies. The applications of 
triangular fuzzy matrix game theory were expanded to the brand valuation field. A new method 
for evaluating the current evaluation models was proposed. Also, evaluation cases were explained. 
2. Triangular fuzzy matrix game 
2.1. Triangular fuzzy number 
In reality, it is usually difficult for us to make an accurate adjustment when we are faced with 
an uncertain future or there is no way for us to get clear of the future profits. In such case, we can 
only get an estimated interval. Nevertheless, the proposing of the triangular fuzzy number 
improves the accuracy, completeness and practicality of the interval estimation. 
Definition 1. Suppose ෤ܽ = (݋, ݌, ݍ) is a triangular fuzzy number and its affiliated function is 
ߤ௔෤(ݔ): ܴ → ሾ0,1ሿ, namely: 
ߤ௔෤(ݔ) =
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
ݔ
݌ − ݋ −
݋
݌ − ݋ , ݔ ∈ ሾ݋, ݌ሿ,
ݍ
ݍ − ݌ −
ݔ
ݍ − ݌ , ݔ ∈ ሾ݌, ݍሿ,
0,				others.
	 (1)
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Definition 2. For any two triangular fuzzy numbers ෤ܽଵ = (݋ଵ, ݌ଵ, ݍଵ) and ෤ܽଶ = (݋ଶ, ݌ଶ, ݍଶ), the 
possibility degree of ෤ܽଵ > ෤ܽଶ is: 
ܸ( ෤ܽଵ ≥ ෤ܽଶ) = ൞
1,				݌ଵ > ݌ଶ,ݍଵ − ݋ଶ
(݌ଶ − ݌ଵ) + (ݍଶ − ݋ଶ),				݌ଵ < ݌ଶ,				ݍଵ > ݋ଶ
0,				ݍଵ < ݋ଶ.
,	 (2)
Definition 3. For any n triangular fuzzy numbers ෤ܽଵ, ෤ܽଶ, . . . , ෤ܽ௡, the possibility degree of a 
triangular fuzzy number ෤ܽ௜ ≥ ෤ܽଵ, . . . , ෤ܽ௡ is: 
ܸ( ෤ܽ௜ ≥ ෤ܽଵ, . . . , ෤ܽ௡) = min{ܸ( ෤ܽ௜ ≥ ෤ܽଵ), ܸ( ෤ܽ௜ ≥ ෤ܽଶ), . . . , ܸ( ෤ܽ௜ ≥ ෤ܽ௡)},				1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊.	 (3)
2.2. Triangular fuzzy matrix game 
In brand valuation, uncertain evaluation result may lead to the adoption of many fuzzy 
strategies by both game participants. Thus, a triangular fuzzy number may be used to indicate the 
profits and losses of the parties. And the profits and losses of game participants can be marked as 
follows: 
ܩ෨ = ൛ ଵܵ, ܵଶ; ܣሚൟ,	 (4)
wherein, ଵܵ = {ߙଵ, ߙଶ, . . . , ߙ௠} means strategy set of game participant 1; ܵଶ = {ߚଵ, ߚଶ, . . . , ߚ௡} 
means strategy set of game participant 2; ܣሚ = ൣ൛ ෤ܽ௜௝, ෨ܾ௜௝ൟ൧௠×௡	(1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݉, 1 ≤ ݆ ≤ ݊) is a profit 
and loss matrix of game participant. When strategy combination is ൛ߙ௜, ߚ௝ൟ, the profit and loss 
matrix of game participant 1 is ෤ܽ௜௝ = ൫ܽ௜௝௢ , ܽ௜௝௣ , ܽ௜௝௤ ൯  and that of game participant 2 is  
෨ܾ௜௝ = ൫ܾ௜௝௢ , ܾ௜௝௣ , ܾ௜௝௤ ൯. 
Definition 4. According to Definition 2, if strategy ߙ௜∗, ߚ௝∗ constitutes the strategy combination 
൛ߙ௜∗, ߚ௝∗ൟ, which meets the condition of ௜ܸ∗௝∗ > 0, the strategy combination ൛ߙ௜∗, ߚ௝∗ൟ will be the 
optimal pure strategy solution based on possibility degree ௜ܸ∗௝
∗. 
Wherein: 
௜ܸ∗௝
∗ = ܸ ቀ ෤ܽ௜∗௝∗ ≥ ෤ܽ௜௝∗ , 1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊ቁ ⋅ ܸ ቀ ෨ܾ௜∗௝
∗ ≥ ෨ܾ௜௝∗ , 1 ≤ ݆ ≤ ݉ቁ.	 (5)
According to the above definitions and parameters, the mixed strategies of the participating 
enterprise and the evaluating institution are: 
ܺ௠ = ൝ݔ = (ݔଵ, ݔଶ, . . . , ݔ௠) อݔ௜ ≥ 0,			1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݉,			෍ݔ௜ = 1
௠
௜ୀଵ
ൡ,	
௡ܻ = ቐݕ = (ݕଵ, ݕଶ, . . . , ݕ௠) ቮݕ௝ ≥ 0,			1 ≤ ݆ ≤ ݊,			෍ݕ௝ = 1
௡
௝ୀଵ
ቑ.	
Suppose that the expected profit of the participating enterprise and the evaluating institution is 
ܧ(ݔ, ݕ). 
Assume the profit matrix of the game participants is expressed in Table 1. 
Then, the expected profit of the game participant 1 is: 
ܧா௡௧௘௥௣௥௜௦௘(ݔ෤, ݕ෤) = ݔ෤ݕ෤ ෤ܽଵଵ + ݔ෤(1 − ݕ෤) ෤ܽଵଶ + (1 − ݔ෤)ݕ෤ ෤ܽଶଵ + (1 − ݔ෤)(1 − ݕ෤) ෤ܽଶଶ.	
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Table 1. Profit matrix of game participants 
Participant 1
Participant 2 
 ߚଵ(ݕ෤) ߚଶ(1 − ݕ෤) 
ߙଵ(ݔ෤) ෤ܽଵଵ, ෨ܾଵଵ ෤ܽଵଶ, ෨ܾଵଶ 
ߙଶ(1 − ݔ෤) ෤ܽଶଵ, ෨ܾଶଵ ෤ܽଶଶ, ෨ܾଶଶ 
Let: 
∂ܧா௡௧௘௥௣௥௜௦௘(ݔ෤, ݕ෤)
∂ݔ෤ = ݕ෤ ෤ܽଵଵ + (1 − ݕ෤) ෤ܽଵଶ − ݕ෤ ෤ܽଶଵ − (1 − ݕ෤) ෤ܽଶଶ = 0.	
Then: 
ݕ෤∗ = ෤ܽଶଶ − ෤ܽଵଶ෤ܽଵଵ − ෤ܽଵଶ − ෤ܽଶଵ + ෤ܽଶଶ.	 (6)
That is, in case of optimal mixed strategy, the evaluating institution selects strategy ߚଵ by using 
the probability ݕ෤∗ and ߚଵ by using the probability ߚଶ.  
Similarly, the expected profit of the game participant 2 is: 
ܧூ୬ୱ୲୧୲୳୲୧୭୬(ݔ෤, ݕ෤) = ݔ෤ݕ෤ ෨ܾଵଵ + ݔ෤(1 − ݕ෤) ෨ܾଵଶ + (1 − ݔ෤)ݕ෤ ෨ܾଶଵ + (1 − ݔ෤)(1 − ݕ෤) ෨ܾଶଶ.	
Let: 
∂ܧூ௡௦௧௜௧௨௧௜௢௡(ݔ෤, ݕ෤)
∂ݕ෤ = ݔ෤ ෨ܾଵଵ − ݔ෤ ෨ܾଵଶ + (1 − ݔ෤) ෨ܾଶଵ − (1 − ݔ෤) ෨ܾଶଶ = 0.	
Then: 
ݔ෤∗ =
෨ܾଶଶ − ෨ܾଵଶ
෨ܾଵଵ − ෨ܾଵଶ − ෨ܾଶଵ + ෨ܾଶଶ
.	 (7)
Thus, the optimal mixed strategy solution is (ݔ෤∗, ݕ෤∗). The meanings of the conclusion can be 
interpreted as follows (Assume ܸ( ෤ܽ	భభ − ෤ܽ	భమ − ෤ܽ	మభ + ෤ܽ	మమ > 0) = 1  and  
ܸ( ෨ܾଵଵ − ෨ܾଵଶ − ෨ܾଶଵ + ෨ܾଶଶ > 0) = 1). 
3. Brand valuation models 
Brand valuation models may be divided into two types: independent evaluation by the 
institution and the evaluation at the request of enterprise. The strategy sets of the participating 
enterprise and the evaluating institution under both types of models are {participate, not 
participate}, {evaluation at the request of enterprise, independent evaluation by the institution}. 
We can assume the profit brought about by evaluation to the brand is ܿ (ܿ >	0), the input at the 
request of enterprise is ܽ (ܽ >	0), the further consultation costs of the enterprise is ݁ (݁ >	0), the 
input of evaluation conducted by the consulting agency under the model of request is ܾ (ܾ >	0), 
the input under the independent evaluation model is ݀ (݀ >	0) and the objective probability of the 
evaluation effect is ݌ (1	≥ ݌ ≥ 0). According to the objective fact, we should assume that the 
profit of the consulting agency is larger than 0 all the time, or ݌݁ > ܾ and ݌݁ > ݀. Also, we should 
assume the probabilities of the enterprise’s adoption of “participate” strategy and of “not 
participate” strategy are respectively ݔ෤ and 1 − ݔ෤ respectively. The probabilities of evaluation at 
the request of enterprise and of independent evaluation are respectively ݕ෤ and 1 − ݕ෤. What is 
worth noticing is that an enterprise has an absolute right of autonomy in evaluation. According to 
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the strategy set of game participants, the following matrix may be obtained as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Profit matrix of participating enterprise and evaluating institution evaluating institution 
 Request (ݕ෤) Independent (1 − ݕ෤) 
Participate (ݔ෤) (−ܽ − ݁, ݌ܿ − ܽ, ܿ − ܽ), (−ܾ, ݌݁ − ܾ, ݁ − ܾ) (0, ݌ܿ − ݁, ܿ), (݀, ݌݁ − ݀, ݁ − ݀) 
Not P. (1 − ݔ෤) (0,0,0), (−ܾ, 0,0) (0, ݌ܿ, ܿ), (−݀, 0,0) 
We calculate the follows according to Eqs. (2) and (3): 
ܸ( ෤ܽଵଵ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) = min{ܸ( ෤ܽଵଵ ≥ ෤ܽଵଵ), ܸ( ෤ܽଵଵ ≥ ෤ܽଶଵ)} = min{1, ܸ( ෤ܽଵଵ ≥ ෤ܽଶଵ)},	
ܸ( ෨ܾଵଵ ≥ ෨ܾ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) = min{ܸ( ෨ܾଵଵ ≥ ෨ܾଵଵ), ܸ( ෨ܾଵଵ ≥ ෨ܾଶଵ)} = 1. 
Similarly, we may calculate as follows: 
ܸ( ෤ܽଵଶ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଶ, ݅ = 1,2) = 1,	
ܸ( ෤ܽଶଵ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) = min{1, ܸ( ෤ܽଶଵ ≥ ෤ܽଵଵ)},	
ܸ( ෤ܽଶଶ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଶ, ݅ = 1,2) = 1,	
ܸ( ෨ܾଵଶ ≥ ෨ܾ௜ଶ, ݅ = 1,2) = 1,	
ܸ൫ ෨ܾଶଵ ≥ ෨ܾ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2൯ =
ܾ
݌݁ + ܾ,	
ܸ( ෨ܾଶଶ ≥ ෨ܾ௜ଶ, ݅ = 1,2) = 1.	
Then: 
(1) When ݌ܿ > ܽ or the profit brought about by evaluation under the model of request is larger 
than the input requested by the enterprise: 
ܸ( ෤ܽଵଵ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) = 1,						
ܸ( ෤ܽଵଶ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଶ, ݅ = 1,2) =
ܿ
݁ + ܿ,	
ܸ( ෤ܽଶଵ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) = min ൜1,
ܽ + ݁
݌ܿ − ܽൠ.	
a) If the profit of the enterprise when participating in brand evaluation is lower than the costs 
of the enterprise’s participation in evaluation and further consultation or ݌ܿ − ܽ > ܽ + ݁, then: 
ܸ( ෤ܽଶଵ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) =
ܽ + ݁
݌ܿ − ܽ.	
We may get the follows by further reference to Eq. (5): 
ଵܸଵ = ܸ( ෤ܽଵଵ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) ⋅ ܸ( ෨ܾଵଵ ≥ ෨ܾ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) = 1.	
Similarly: 
ଵܸଶ =
ܿ
ܽ + ܿ ,					 ଶܸଵ =
(ܽ + ݁) ⋅ ܾ
(݌ܿ − ܽ) ⋅ (1 + ݌)݁,					 ଶܸଶ = 1.	
According to Definition 4, {participate, independent}, {not participate, request} and {not 
participate, independent} are the optimal pure strategy solutions when the possibility degree is 1, 
ܿ (ܽ + ܿ)⁄  and ((ܽ + ݁) ⋅ ܾ) ((݌ܿ − ܽ) ⋅ (1 + ݌)݁)⁄ . 
b) If the profit of the enterprise when participating in brand evaluation is lower than the costs 
of the enterprise’s participation in evaluation and further consultation or ݌ܿ − ܽ = ܽ + ݁, then: 
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ܸ( ෤ܽଶଵ ≥ ෤ܽ௜ଵ, ݅ = 1,2) = 1.	
{Participate, independent}, {not participate, request} and {not participate, independent} are 
the optimal pure strategy solution to ܿ (ܽ + ܿ)⁄ , ܾ ((1 + ݌)݁)⁄  and 1 when the possibility degree 
of the game is 1. 
(2) When ݌ܿ < ܽ, the profit brought about by evaluation under the request model is smaller 
than the input requested by the enterprise, then {Participate, independent}, {not participate, 
request} and {not participate, independent} are the optimal pure strategy solutions when the 
possibility degree is ܿ (ܽ + ܿ)⁄ , 1, 1. 
4. Case application and analysis 
Example 1: The triangular fuzzy profit matrix of the participating enterprise and the evaluating 
institution is shown in Table 3 below. The profit brought about by evaluation to the brand is 
300,000 Yuan; the input requested by the enterprise is 50,000 Yuan; the further consultation costs 
of the enterprise is 100,000 Yuan; the input of evaluation conducted by the consulting agency is 
20,000 Yuan; the input under the independent evaluation model is 40,000 and the objective 
probability of the evaluation effect is 0.75. 
Table 3. Profit matrix case 1 of participating enterprise and evaluating institution (Unit: 10,000 Yuan) 
 Request (ݕ෤) Independent (1 − ݕ෤) 
Participate (ݔ෤) (–15,17.5,25), (–2,5.5,8) (0,12.5,30), (4,3.5,6) 
Not P. (1 − ݔ෤) (0,0,0), (–2,0,0) (0,22.5,30), (–4,0,0) 
So, ଵܸଵ = 1, ଵܸଶ = 0.75, ଶܸଵ = 0, and ଶܸଶ = 0. Thus, {participate, request}, {not participate, 
independent} are the optimal pure strategy solutions when the possibility degree of the game is 1, 
0.75. 
Example 2: The profit brought about by evaluation to the brand is 150,000 Yuan; the input 
requested by the enterprise is 50,000 Yuan; the further consultation costs of the enterprise is 
100,000 Yuan; the input of evaluation conducted by the consulting agency is 20,000 Yuan; the 
input under the independent evaluation model is 40,000 Yuan and the objective probability of the 
evaluation effect is 0.6. 
There is no way to get the optional strategy solution according to Definition 4. According to 
Eq. (6) to (7), the optimal mixed strategy is {(0, 0, 1/3),(0, 3/4, 1)}, that is, the enterprise selects 
the “participate” strategy using fuzzy probability (0, 0, 1/3); the “not participate” strategy using 
fuzzy probability (2/3, 1, 1); the “request” strategy using fuzzy probability (0, 3/4, 1)and 
independent strategy using fuzzy strategy (0, 1/4, 1). 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, the game problem in brand valuation where profits and losses are given in the 
form of triangular fuzzy number was studied. The fuzzy matrix game theory was expanded to the 
brand evaluation field. The methods for pure strategy judgment and mixed strategy solutions based 
on the brand valuation models for triangular fuzzy matrix game was proposed. The certain number 
is replaced by the fuzzy number so as to make the game match the practical evaluation better. 
However, in the triangular fuzzy matrix game of brand valuation, no game participant especially 
the enterprise’s risk preference was taken into account. For the policy makers with different risk 
preferences, it is more likely for them to adopt different decisions. It is the issue to be further 
studied. 
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